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The Magistrate's Failure To Apply The Correct Legal Standard Is Not Harmless Error 
Mr. Urresti's contention that the magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress was based 
on the application of an improper legal standard implicitly challenges the district court's opinion 
that "[t]he magistrate's comment constituted harmless error under the circumstances of this 
case." (R., p. 57.) An error may be deemed harmless if it does not affect a substantial right of Mr. 
Urresti. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 636, 977 P.2d 890, 898 (1999) (citing I.C.R. 52). The 
magistrate's erroneous position that he had to view the case "in a light most favorable to the 
State" clearly effects the substantial rights of Urresti by giving undue consideration and 
deference to the state. (Tr. p. 67, Ls. 12-16.) The magistrate's statement of an incorrect legal 
standard resulted in the denial of Mr. Urresti' s motion to suppress. 
The issue of harmless error in the context of suppression motions was addressed in State 
v. Stone. 154 Idaho 949, 303 P.3d 636 (Ct. App. 2013). At a suppression hearing in that case, the 
court heard a neuropsychologist's testimony regarding the defendant's psychological makeup 
and his medical status during an interrogation. Id. at 952, 303 P.3d at 639. The state objected to 
the neuropsychologist's testimony on the grounds of relevancy. Id. The district court deferred 
ruling on the state's objection until after the court heard the neuropsychologist's testimony. Id. 
Ultimately, the district court ruled that it would consider the neuropsychologist's testimony 
regarding the defendant's medical status, but would not consider his testimony regarding the 
defendant's psychological makeup. Id. The district court determined the neuropsychologist's 
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testimony about the defendant's psychological makeup was not relevant in the determination as 
to whether the defendant's confession was voluntary. Id. at 958, 303 P.3d at 645. Ultimately, the 
court determined that the district court erred when it failed to consider the neuropsychologist's 
testimony concerning the defendant's psychological makeup. Id. at 959, 303 P.3d at 646. The 
court specified that it was the burden of the state to demonstrate that the error did not contribute 
to the court's decision to deny the defendant's motion to suppress. Id. However, the court 
ultimately agreed with the state's assertion that, under the totality of the circumstances, the court 
would have found that the defendant's statements were voluntary even if the district court had 
considered the neuropsychologist's testimony. Id. at 959-60, 303 P.3d at 646-47. Accordingly, 
the district court's error was harmless. Id. at 959, 303 P.3d at 646. 
In Stone, the court reviewed a district court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress 
in the context of that court's failure to consider a portion of expert testimony. Mr. Urresti is 
before this Court after the district court, in its intermediate appellate capacity, affirmed the 
magistrate's denial of Mr. Urresti's motion to suppress. However, Mr. Urresti contends that the 
magistrate's error directly contributed to the denial of his motion to suppress. Here, the 
magistrate announced, and erroneously relied upon, an incorrect legal standard when he ruled on 
the motion to suppress. That incorrect legal standard was the lens through which the magistrate 
assessed the suppression proceeding. The district court noted that it was "unclear what standard 
the magistrate was relying upon when he said he was viewing the evidence presented in a light 
favorable to the State." (R., p. 56.) The district court determined that the state's interpretation of 
the magistrate's comment, which was that the magistrate "correctly noted [he] must evaluate the 
2 
officer's judgment and perception of the facts as the officer is observing them at the time," was 
reasonable and was a correct legal statement. (R., p. 56.) 
The district court failed to take the magistrate's statement at face value, despite noting 
that it was unclear. It is evident that the magistrate was not just viewing the evidence presented at 
the suppression hearing in a light favorable to the state as the district court noted, but in a light 
most favorable to the state, as reflected in the transcript and in the district court's transcription of 
the magistrate's ruling in its opinion. (R., pp. 55-56, Tr., p. 67, Ls. 12-16, emphasis added.) It is 
inconsistent that the district court would adopt the state's interpretation of the magistrate's 
comment as a correct legal statement, but subsequently detennine that the magistrate's comment 
was an error, albeit, a hannless one. (R., pp. 56-57.) 
The magistrate erred in applying an incorrect legal standard when the court considered 
that evidence before it. That incorrect legal standard contributed to the magistrate's denial of Mr. 
Urresti's motion to suppress. If the magistrate had applied the correct legal standard, the outcome 
of the suppression hearing could have resulted in the magistrate ruling that Mr. Urresti was 
subjected to warrantless and unreasonable seizure. Accordingly, the magistrate's comment did 
not constitute hannless error. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Affirmed The Magistrate's Denial Of The Motion To Suppress 
The district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate's ruling which denied Mr. 
Urresti's motion to suppress. The district court erred in holding that Corporal Grabe's actions 
were reasonable in accordance with standard set forth by the Fourth Amendment. (R., p. 58.) 
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Pursuant to the standard of review, this court will defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they 
are supported by substantial evidence, but will freely review the trial court's determination as to 
whether constitutional standards have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Atkinson, 
128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 
10, 12, 878 P.2d 184, 186 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1008, 783 P.2d 874, 
875 (Ct. App. 1989)). Corporal Grabe's actions were unreasonable as they resulted from Boise 
Police Department's failure to comply with the statutory provisions that govern law 
enforcement's use of temporary road blocks. Additionally, Mr. Urresti was impermissibly seized 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment by Corporal Grabe when there was no continuing 
justification for his detention. Accordingly, the district court erred when it held the stop was 
justified both because Mr. Urresti drove past a police road block and as a result of the police 
community caretaking function. 
The Idaho legislature has conferred the authority on law enforcement to establish 
temporary road blocks "for the purpose of apprehending persons reasonably believed by such 
officers to be wanted for violation of the laws of this state, of any other state, or of the United 
States, and using such highways or streets." Idaho Code§ 19-621. Further, I.C. § 19-620 defines 
a "temporary road block" as "any structure, device or means used by duly authorized law 
enforcement officers of the state of Idaho and of its political subdivisions for the purpose of 
controlling all traffic through a point on a highway whereby all vehicles may be slowed or 
stopped." In this case, the road block was not established for the purpose of apprehending a 
person. However, law enforcement did intend that the road block would control traffic and stop 
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any traffic from proceeding through the road block. (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 19-21; Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2-7.) 
The state concedes that there was a road block in place, but suggests that the road block "was not 
designed to compel contact between police and motorists, but was in fact designed to accomplish 
the opposite." (Respondent's brief, p. 7.) The district court opined that the stop of Mr. Urresti 
was justified because Mr. Urresti drove his vehicle past the police road block into a crime 
investigation zone. (R., p. 57.) The state argues that it was Mr. Urresti's "failure to comply with 
the implicit command to stay out of the police cordon that caused the police to interact with him 
at all." (Respondent's brief, pp. 7-8.) 
The Idaho legislature has prescribed specific mm1mum requirements when law 
enforcement establish temporary road blocks. I.C. § 19-622. Importantly, none of those 
requirements where adhered to in this case. These minimum requirements are in place "[ f]or the 
purpose of warning and protecting the traveling public" and are "to be met by such officers 
establishing temporary road blocks, if time and circumstances allow ... " Id. A temporary road 
block must be established at a point on the street clearly visible at a distance of not less than 100 
yards in either direction. LC. § 19-622(1). Additionally, a sign with the word "stop" shall be 
placed on the center line of the street at the point of the temporary road block that is readable at a 
distance of not less than 50 yards. LC. § 19-622(2). At least one flashing or intermittent blue 
light, visible at not less than 100 yards, must also be placed at the side of the street at the point of 
the temporary road block. LC. § 19-622(3). Finally, warning signs must be placed not less than 
200 yards from the point of the temporary road block that warn oncoming traffic that a police 
stop lies ahead. LC. § 19-622( 4). A burning light, flare, or reflector must also be placed near any 
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such sign for the purpose of attracting the attention of the traffic to the sign. Id. Compliance with 
these minimum requirements serves an important function, as a person may be subject to a 
criminal penalty for failure to comply with the traffic control function of a road block. See I.C. § 
19-623. 
Boise Police Department did not employ the statutory minimum requirements when they 
established the temporary road block at issue in this case. In fact, the only measures that were 
taken by law enforcement were parking a sergeant's police explorer with no emergency lights on 
across a portion of the street and placing police vehicles further down with emergency lights on. 
(Tr., p. 14, Ls. 19-21; Tr., p. 15, Ls. 17-22; Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2-7; Tr., p. 27, L. 23 - p. 28, L. 8; Tr., 
p. 30, Ls. 17 - p. 31, L. 10; Tr., p. 33, Ls. 1-19.) Further, Corporal Grabe acknowledged during 
his testimony that there wasn't anyone out directing traffic at the time Mr. Urresti approached 
and there were no flares out. (Tr., p. 33, Ls. 20-25.) It does not appear that there was any 
circumstance that would have prevented Boise Police Department from complying with the 
statutory requirements, as Corporal Grabe indicated that they "were there for 15, 20 minutes 
before that." (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 9-11.) 
Mr. Urresti entered into an ambiguous situation that certainly wasn't readily identifiable 
as a police road block as required by LC. § 19-622. The lack of any obvious indicators that a 
temporary police road block was in place has been used to validate Corporal Grabe's seizure of 
Mr. Urresti. Corporal Grabe testified that he motioned for Mr. Urresti to back up, and Mr. Urresti 
did back up (Tr., p. 19, L. 23 p. 20, L. 1 O; Tr., p. 34, L. 13 - p. 35, L. 18.) After Mr. Urresti 
began backing up, Corporal Grabe commanded Mr. Urresti to stop. (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 13-17; Tr., p. 
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35, Ls. 16-23.) Corporal Grabe then had Mr. Urresti roll down his window. (Tr., p. 21, L. 13; Tr. 
p. 35, L. 25 - p. 36, L.2.) If Boise Police Department had complied with the requirements of LC. 
§ 19-622, Mr. Urresti would have been on notice that there was a police road block in place. 
Corporal Grabe would have had no reason to stop and seize Mr. Urresti unless he had ignored the 
requisite signs, lights, and warnings. 
Additionally, the district court cited I.C. § 18-705 ("Resisting and Obstructing Officers") 
when ruling that "[t]he stop was justified by the fact that the appellant was driving his vehicle 
past a police roadblock into a crime investigation zone." (R., p. 57.) The crime of resisting or 
obstructing an officer contains a wilful element. I.C. § 18-705. Mr. Urresti could not have 
wilfully driven past the police road block because the minimum requirements for a temporary 
road block were not adhered to by the Boise Police Department. Mr. Urresti had virtually no 
indication that the police vehicle he encountered was serving as a temporary road block. The 
district court also justified the stop "by the police community caretaking function." (R., p. 57.) 
The stop was not justified by the police community caretaking function because the Idaho 
legislature has identified the minimum requirements that must be satisfied when law enforcement 
establishes temporary road blocks, if time and circumstances allow, "for the purpose of warning 
and protecting the traveling public ... " I.C. § 19-622 (emphasis added). It would have been 
unnecessary for Corporal Grabe to further command Mr. Urresti to stop and roll down his 
window because Mr. Urresti would have been adequately warned and protected by the signage 
and lighting required by LC. § 19-622. These measures inherently serve a community caretaking 
function. 
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Regardless, Mr. Urresti complied with all of Corporal Grabe's commands. Corporal 
Grabe had no reason to further detain Mr. Urresti after he backed away. Accordingly, Mr. Urresti 
should not have been detained, even momentarily, because Corporal Grabe did not have 
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 
465 (Ct. App. 2002). Boise Police Department's failure to comply with the statutory 
requirements should not be utilized to justify Corporal Grabe's seizure of Mr. Urresti. The 
continued detention of Mr. Urresti was unreasonable and unconstitutional. Accordingly, the 
district court erred in affirming the magistrate's denial of Mr. Urresti's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Urresti respectfully requests that this Court reverse the appellate decision of the 
district court which affinned the magistrate court's denial of the Mr. Urresti's motion to suppress 
and remand this matter to the magistrate court for further proceedings. 
DATED this ?111 day of September 2016. 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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